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Title(NE)ENAKOVREDNOST POGODBENIH DAJATEV
TitleInequality of contractual duties
AuthorCepec, Jaka
Subject(s)ekonomska analiza prava; pogodbeno pravo; enakost dajatev; enakovrednost dajatev; primerjalno pravo; laesio enormis; čezmerno prikrajšanje; oderuštvo; asimetrija informacij; predpogodbeno razkritje informacij.; Contract law; law&economics; laesio enormis; equality in exchange; comparative law; information asymmetry; law of obligations; usury; info:eu-repo/classification/udc/347.44(043.2)
Abstract

Avtor v magistrskem delu s pomočjo zgodovinske, primerjalne in ekonomske analize kritično obravnava eno izmed temeljnih načel slovenskega obligacijskega prava, načelo enake vrednosti dajatev. S pomočjo zgodovinske analize avtor ugotavlja, da je vprašanje enakovrednosti dajatev že zelo staro pravno vprašanje, ki se je skozi pravno zgodovino obravnavalo zelo različno in do danes ostaja sporno, kdaj oziroma v katerih primerih naj pravo varuje enakovrednost pogodbenih dajatev in s tem poseže v avtonomijo pogodbenega dogovora. Na podlagi razmeroma obsežne primerjalnopravne analize avtor ugotavlja, da moderni pravni redi v veliki večini nasprotujejo pravnim institutom, ki »kaznujejo« neenakost pogodbenih dajatev kot »zlo« samo po sebi (kot npr. klasični laesio enormis), da pa po drugi strani nudijo pogodbeni stranki določeno varstvo, saj je neenakost pogodbenih dajatev indic za neko drugo »zlo«. Analiza je razkrila pomembno dejstvo, da je primerjalna sodna praksa, ne glede na siceršnje pozitivnopravne rešitve, izjemno podobna oziroma praktično enaka. Avtor v zaključku primerjalnopravne analize ugotavlja, da je načelo enakovrednosti pogodbenih dajatev, kot eno izmed temeljnih načel slovenskega obligacijskega prava, primerjalna redkost, ki je v skladu z opravljeno interdisciplinarno analizo nepotrebno. S pomočjo ekonomske analize avtor ugotavlja, da klasični pravni instituiu, ki varujejo enakost pogodbenih dajatev v nasprotju z dognanji ekonomske znanosti še vedno temeljijo na predpostavki, da ima v sporu objektivna vrednost pogodbenih dajatev prednost pred subjektivno vrednostjo dajatev, kot sta jih stranki, glede na svoje preference, določili pri sklenitvi pogodbe. V nadaljevanju avtor zato ekonomsko analizo usmeri predvsem v vprašanje pravnih sredstev, ki varujejo neenakost kot posledico nekega drugega »zla« in ugotavlja, da je temeljni razlog za neenakost asimetrija informacij. Pravo bi moralo problem asimetrije informacij reševati s pomočjo pravila, da mora informacije proizvesti in posredovati tista pogodbena stranka, ki lahko to naredi z nižjimi stroški, pri tem pa mora biti uveljavljena izjema od dolžnosti razkritja informacij, ki naj velja za načrtno pridobljene produktivne informacije. Avtor v zaključku, v skladu s predstavljenimi rezultati analize zastavljenega problema, predlaga, da bi bilo smiselno razmisliti o tem, da bi institute slovenskega prava, ki varujejo enakovrednost pogodbenih dajatev, nadomestili s kombinacijo pravil o razkritju predpogodbenih informacij in z doslednim sankcioniranjem pogodb, sklenjenih pod prisilo.

The author of the thesis critically discusses one of the fundamental principles of Slovenian law of obligations, the principle of equality in exchange, using historical, comparative and economic analysis of law. Using historical analysis, the author notes that the question of equality of contractual duties is a very old question which has been, over the history of law, dealt very differently. It has been very debatable when or in which cases should law protect the equivalency of contractual duties and therefore interfere with the autonomy of the contractual agreement. On the basis of a relatively large-scale comparative analysis, the author notes that the modern legal systems in the vast majority oppose the legal institutes that punish inequality of the contractual duties as an "evil" in itself. They offer protection, since inequality of the contractual duties is seen as an indication for another "evil." The comparative analysis revealed a significant fact that regardless of the introduced law, case law solutions in compared legal systems are very similar or virtually identical. The author concludes the comparative law analysis with the fact that the principle of equality in exchange, as one of the fundamental principles of Slovenian law of obligations, is a comparative rarity, which is in accordance with the interdisciplinary analysis, unnecessary. Using economic analysis, the author notes that the classical legal institutes, which protect the equality of contractual duties, are based on an assumption, contrary to the findings of modern economic science, that in a case of dispute the objective value of the contractual duties should have precedence over the subjective value of the contractual duties, which depend on the parties’ preferences as established in the contract. Therefore the author’s main question is focused on the legal remedies that protect the inequality as a result of some other "evil". The basic economic reason for inequality lies in the information asymmetry, that’s way the main focus of the economy analysis, is on solving the asymmetry problem. The law should address the problem of informational asymmetry through the rule, that the parties should have the obligation to gather and communicate pre-contractual information, with the exception of deliberately produced productive information, which the parties have no duty to reveal The author concludes, that in accordance with the presented results of the analysis it would be reasonable to consider to replace the legal institutes in the Slovenian law of obligation that protect the equality of contractual duties, by a combination of rules on disclosure of pre-contractual information and the full sanctioning of contracts concluded under duress.

PublisherJ. Cepec
ContributorTratnik, Matjaž
Date2011-03-24
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Identifier
Identifier
Identifier
Languageslv
Formatapplication/pdf
AudienceStudents
SourceMaribor
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess